What would change a choice, and who bears it
Each of Chapters 1 to 28 ends its argument with the evidence that would change its choice, and says who bears the choice's cost. They are quoted here as the chapters write them: the conditions grouped by the kind of evidence they name, the costs by who bears them. A sentence that names several appears under each.
What would change a choice
An alternative that serves as well
I would reconsider on either of two findings: that verification can run, among many unregistered people, beside a fallback that keeps every legitimate claimant served while identity is checked; or that standing by encounter lets duplicate claims grow until genuine claimants go without essentials. Either would reverse the comparison this choice rests on.
I would reconsider if integrated records with contest before effect and independent review were shown, for the people least able to contest, to produce fewer wrongful adverse decisions than purpose-bound records, or if people whose need sat in one office's file were shown to go unfound for want of a joined account.
I would reconsider the named goods if cash brought shelter, care and company to people who cannot manage money, a small child or an adult in crisis, as reliably as provision does.
I would reconsider the unconditional debt only on evidence that a test of inability can be run without shutting out the people it exists to reach.
I would reconsider if witnessed receipts proved easy to forge in concert at scale, if providers were found holding back delivery until a witness could attend, or if authentication with an assured fallback of serving first were shown to turn away nobody entitled.
I would reconsider on evidence that deferential review reaches people in desperate need as reliably as a declared minimum, or that declared plans and interim orders secure essentials no faster than ordinary budgets.
I would reconsider on two findings together: that requiring a complete record before a protective act lets serious harm through that discretion would have stopped, and that discretion checked only after the fact falls evenly on the people it touches and is corrected when it errs.
I would reopen the list only on evidence that an open purpose test, applied by independent reviewers, protects dissent and unpopular belief as reliably as two fixed grounds while answering those injuries too.
I would reconsider on evidence that a work condition with a hardship exception moves people into lasting work without the debt and ill health the Welfare Conditionality project recorded, and without the discretion the auditors found; and I would narrow the control test if written terms proved to track who controls the work as reliably as the facts do.
I would reconsider requiring a finding if people who depend on a gate repeatedly waited longer than the harm lasted, while thresholds reached the same gates with few mistaken designations.
I would reconsider the measures if continuation findings kept renewing them while the disadvantage stayed where it was, or if identical treatment with accessibility and accommodation removed a disadvantage as quickly.
Evidence that advisory offices alone secured review before irreversible commitments would favour removing the pause.
I would reconsider if welfare regimes were shown to prevent severe avoidable suffering as reliably where owners or industries gain from it, or if a separate Advocate were shown to be captured by the uses it watches or to stall decisions a single office would make better.
Evidence that the food rule left people short of adequate food despite the floor, or that humane standards reliably spared farmed animals severe suffering in life and at death, would favour narrowing the food rule.
I would reconsider if people whose will could not be read after support came to more harm under a best-interpretation route than comparable people under best-interests decisions, or if support-first left needed decisions waiting; no study comparing the two in practice is cited here, so the choice rests on how each is built.
I would reconsider the firewall if people without papers used services as readily where enforcement reads service records as where it cannot; the residence line if former residents stayed as bound by a place's decisions as the people living there, or if a workable institution gave people affected from outside a say without taking the government's accountability from those it governs; and the consent line if harms classed as reversible repeatedly proved permanent once consultation had let them proceed.
I would reconsider on evidence that hearing-first orders, decided promptly, protect people who expose officials from retaliatory prosecution as reliably as protection that starts with the exposure, while delaying fewer unrelated cases.
I would reconsider the council if collective executives under the same limits missed lawful deadlines more often than cabinets; the Regions Council if protected competence and judicial review alone kept regional self-government secure; and divided appointments if records showed one coalition directing the separate sources, or if elected confirmation kept reviewers as independent at lower cost.
I would reconsider if disenfranchisement fitted by a judge to each offence were shown to cut reoffending or protect elections while falling evenly across groups.
I would reconsider on evidence that automatic propagation, with contest before effect, produced fewer wrongful adverse decisions and fewer missed entitlements than holdings bound to one purpose. I would begin by letting a favourable automated change take effect on one actor's record, with a reviewer able to withdraw it, as a person's own access request already does.
I would reconsider on evidence that emergencies bring needs that no hazard-specific, reviewable measure can meet but an Article 4 derogation can, with the derogation ending on time and review correcting its errors. Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin's comparative study of three models of the law's response to crisis, from the Roman republic to the responses to the London attacks of July 2005, is where I would look.
I would reconsider if readings of the core repeatedly blocked reforms that kept its protections whole, if the route repeatedly stalled rights-preserving reforms with majority support, or if constitutions without a fixed core proved as reliable at keeping the losers of a political contest able to live, dissent and seek correction.
I would reconsider if prisons that owed the people they hold the whole floor as a constitutional debt were shown to hold them less safely, or to see more reoffending after release, than systems that suspended those claims for the sentence; or if the floor owed inside prisons were shown to come out of what the people they harmed receive.
I would reconsider if people whose harms fell below the line were shown repeatedly to cause grave harm from less restrictive places that a secure place would have prevented, and if a scored assessment predicted that harm accurately and evenly across groups.
I would reconsider on evidence from outside Norway that confinement's protective gains vanish or reverse; on evidence that measures short of confinement protect people from further grave harm as well, in the cases where adjudicators now find them insufficient; on evidence that a bounded power grows despite its bounds, as Gilmore describes; and on evidence that lapses recur despite the duty to review, which would call for earlier review rather than automatic extension.
I would reconsider on evidence that inspections run by holding institutions find and correct denied contact as often and as fast as independent visiting bodies, judged by what detained people report, or that independent findings come so slowly that people stay isolated longer than internal correction would leave them. The two texts I rely on state a standard; a study comparing the two kinds of inspection could settle the question.
The rule costing more than it protects
I would reconsider on either of two findings: that verification can run, among many unregistered people, beside a fallback that keeps every legitimate claimant served while identity is checked; or that standing by encounter lets duplicate claims grow until genuine claimants go without essentials. Either would reverse the comparison this choice rests on.
I would reconsider if integrated records with contest before effect and independent review were shown, for the people least able to contest, to produce fewer wrongful adverse decisions than purpose-bound records, or if people whose need sat in one office's file were shown to go unfound for want of a joined account.
I would reconsider if witnessed receipts proved easy to forge in concert at scale, if providers were found holding back delivery until a witness could attend, or if authentication with an assured fallback of serving first were shown to turn away nobody entitled.
I would reconsider the proof requirement if allocation repeatedly came too late because the finding took longer than the shortage.
I would reconsider on two findings together: that requiring a complete record before a protective act lets serious harm through that discretion would have stopped, and that discretion checked only after the fact falls evenly on the people it touches and is corrected when it errs.
And I would narrow the suspensive challenge on evidence that challenges routinely keep evidenced harms running through review.
I would reconsider requiring a finding if people who depend on a gate repeatedly waited longer than the harm lasted, while thresholds reached the same gates with few mistaken designations.
I would reconsider proof by effect if it drove providers out of a domain rather than into changing their practices.
I would reconsider if separate ceilings were shown repeatedly to stop activities that independent review found would have left the commons better protected as a whole, or if Guardian pauses were shown to serve delay, most reviews lifting them on the same evidence.
Evidence that the food rule left people short of adequate food despite the floor, or that humane standards reliably spared farmed animals severe suffering in life and at death, would favour narrowing the food rule.
I would reconsider if people whose will could not be read after support came to more harm under a best-interpretation route than comparable people under best-interests decisions, or if support-first left needed decisions waiting; no study comparing the two in practice is cited here, so the choice rests on how each is built.
I would reconsider the council if collective executives under the same limits missed lawful deadlines more often than cabinets; the Regions Council if protected competence and judicial review alone kept regional self-government secure; and divided appointments if records showed one coalition directing the separate sources, or if elected confirmation kept reviewers as independent at lower cost.
I would reconsider the home rule if long confinement left people so cut off from their last home that its decisions stopped reaching them, and then only toward letting the person, never the custodian, choose whether the place of confinement becomes the person's political home.
I would reconsider the open request if requests from anyone were shown to crowd review until well-founded ones waited longer than the harm they concerned.
I would reconsider if readings of the core repeatedly blocked reforms that kept its protections whole, if the route repeatedly stalled rights-preserving reforms with majority support, or if constitutions without a fixed core proved as reliable at keeping the losers of a political contest able to live, dissent and seek correction.
I would reconsider the timing rule if case witnesses were found to misdate disclosures, or if the review owed within a pending case proved too slow to catch retaliation. The case that opens this Part shows how long such a wait can run: people were held three to ten years for a trial that had not come.
I would reconsider if prisons that owed the people they hold the whole floor as a constitutional debt were shown to hold them less safely, or to see more reoffending after release, than systems that suspended those claims for the sentence; or if the floor owed inside prisons were shown to come out of what the people they harmed receive.
I would reconsider if people whose harms fell below the line were shown repeatedly to cause grave harm from less restrictive places that a secure place would have prevented, and if a scored assessment predicted that harm accurately and evenly across groups.
I would reconsider on evidence that inspections run by holding institutions find and correct denied contact as often and as fast as independent visiting bodies, judged by what detained people report, or that independent findings come so slowly that people stay isolated longer than internal correction would leave them. The two texts I rely on state a standard; a study comparing the two kinds of inspection could settle the question.
A safeguard failing in practice
I would reconsider if witnessed receipts proved easy to forge in concert at scale, if providers were found holding back delivery until a witness could attend, or if authentication with an assured fallback of serving first were shown to turn away nobody entitled.
I would reconsider if the permitted grounds proved to favour the same groups a lifespan figure would.
I would reconsider on evidence that deferential review reaches people in desperate need as reliably as a declared minimum, or that declared plans and interim orders secure essentials no faster than ordinary budgets.
I would reconsider leaving debt to legislation if disclosed and audited borrowing repeatedly let debt service crowd out commons duties or the services above the floor.
I would reconsider the measures if continuation findings kept renewing them while the disadvantage stayed where it was, or if identical treatment with accessibility and accommodation removed a disadvantage as quickly.
I would reconsider if separate ceilings were shown repeatedly to stop activities that independent review found would have left the commons better protected as a whole, or if Guardian pauses were shown to serve delay, most reviews lifting them on the same evidence.
I would reconsider if welfare regimes were shown to prevent severe avoidable suffering as reliably where owners or industries gain from it, or if a separate Advocate were shown to be captured by the uses it watches or to stall decisions a single office would make better.
For children, I would reconsider if recording a young child's account led offices to treat it as the child's own decision.
I would reconsider the council if collective executives under the same limits missed lawful deadlines more often than cabinets; the Regions Council if protected competence and judicial review alone kept regional self-government secure; and divided appointments if records showed one coalition directing the separate sources, or if elected confirmation kept reviewers as independent at lower cost.
And if human reviewers were shown to adopt automated recommendations as they came, the requirement would protect nobody, and I would look for another safeguard.
I would add Ackerman's escalator to renewals if separately renewed measures hardened into standing power all the same.
I would narrow restoration if people offered a meeting were found to agree under pressure, or if trials run by independent researchers lost the effect.
I would reconsider if readings of the core repeatedly blocked reforms that kept its protections whole, if the route repeatedly stalled rights-preserving reforms with majority support, or if constitutions without a fixed core proved as reliable at keeping the losers of a political contest able to live, dissent and seek correction.
I would move toward immunity on evidence that reviewers shown to be eligible regularly certify retaliatory prosecutions as unrelated.
I would reconsider the timing rule if case witnesses were found to misdate disclosures, or if the review owed within a pending case proved too slow to catch retaliation. The case that opens this Part shows how long such a wait can run: people were held three to ten years for a trial that had not come.
I would move toward the related-role disqualification the Act describes on evidence that people under a properly made finding of dishonesty go on to distort the records of the same office at rates its own independence and review rules fail to catch.
Evidence that owed reviews go unheld would call for a stronger way to compel them and a remedy for the person kept waiting, never for a wider restriction.
I would reconsider on evidence from outside Norway that confinement's protective gains vanish or reverse; on evidence that measures short of confinement protect people from further grave harm as well, in the cases where adjudicators now find them insufficient; on evidence that a bounded power grows despite its bounds, as Gilmore describes; and on evidence that lapses recur despite the duty to review, which would call for earlier review rather than automatic extension.
A line drawn in the wrong place
And I would reconsider the refusal to count years if a recurring shortage showed that a prognosis confined to this resource, free of age and disability, would save many lives these grounds lose.
I would add a third ground if a serious, evidenced injury kept recurring that neither ground could name.
Evidence that animals fared better where institutions gave them a representative voice or a duty to their flourishing would favour going beyond the core.
I would reconsider the firewall if people without papers used services as readily where enforcement reads service records as where it cannot; the residence line if former residents stayed as bound by a place's decisions as the people living there, or if a workable institution gave people affected from outside a say without taking the government's accountability from those it governs; and the consent line if harms classed as reversible repeatedly proved permanent once consultation had let them proceed.
I would narrow permanence on evidence that retaliation for exposing an official ends when the official leaves office. The survey figures leave both questions open; a study of prosecutions that follow disclosures about public officials could answer them.
I would redraw the lines themselves if serious harms regularly fell outside both definitions.
Who bears the costs
People left waiting
Proof also costs time: until a finding is made, an orderly ration waits and claimants rely on the floor's ordinary duties.
A wage attested only by the employer stays unconcluded until another attester authorised for Selin records it, and care attested only by the clinic waits for a witness authorised for Selin; Selin bears both waits.
A request filed with an office lacking authority to receive it waits until that authority is recorded.
For strikes, the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association confines minimum services to what is strictly necessary; I bind only the provider or the parties, and people relying on the service bear any gap.
My finding is slower, and the person who depends on a gate bears the wait.
A Guardian's pause delays the irreversible part of an authorised activity, a delay its proponent and those awaiting its benefits bear.
A decision waits while support can still be given, and the person and anyone relying on it bear the wait.
The Council's return delays an ordinary law by one round of public reconsideration, and whoever needs that law waits through it.
During a failed formation the caretaker keeps to existing law, so anyone who needs a new policy waits for a lawful government; during budget deadlock only the enumerated continuity set continues.
People whose lives change often bear the repetition, and claimants bear the wait.
People harmed or left unprotected
An official's accurate suspicion must become a properly made finding before it counts against anyone, and the people it would protect wait meanwhile.
An officer who holds only an identification lacks a search under the record, and whoever that search might have protected bears the cost of the record it still lacks.
A restricting body must assemble evidence, three agreeing attesters, reasons and review before it acts, and the people a restriction would protect wait while it does; while a challenge suspends the restriction, they wait again.
A restriction needs one of the two grounds, so people hurt only by offence or disagreement find this route closed.
I answer the purpose question in advance, with two grounds, and that costs whatever an open test would have protected: the waits and the closed route counted above fall hardest on people whose injury from speech is offence alone, a community whose sacred things are mocked among them, where a balancing court might weigh their injury against the speaker's freedom.
The firewall takes a source of information from enforcement, and the bar on return leaves the republic to meet a dangerous person's danger within its own law, at its residents' risk.
The cost falls on people injured in the cases the shield holds back: confinement in those cases waits on the shield's case-specific limits, set out in The Shield (Chapter 23).
Against the alternative my rule costs the time and breadth counted above, borne by the people injured in the cases the shield holds back, and a forged seating widens the answerable set further.
A person convicted of the gravest crime keeps the vote and may stand for office, and the people the crime harmed see the offender keep a share in governing them.
Where Article 4 would let a strictly required measure set a derogable right aside, that right here still binds the measure, so a response an executive judges useful may stay out of reach, and the people exposed to the hazard bear the loss.
Against Ackerman, a renewal renews the same four powers however large its majority; broader consent buys no broader power, and whoever a wider measure would have protected bears that.
Because a filing suspends its case until uninvolved reviewers decide, a challenge that will fail still interrupts the custody it challenges, and whoever that custody protects bears the interval.
The injured person bears that wait, and still holds a claim to assistance, protection and remedy on its own grounds.
Someone who did deceive may therefore escape a finding when the case is incomplete, and the people that person later examines bear the risk.
A seated examiner under a finding keeps the appointment, and only the signature on a new finding stops counting; the people that examiner deals with rely on each record's own rules to catch a second deception.
The public owes the whole floor to people who have harmed others, the gravest offender included, at the level it owes the people they harmed, and those people must accept it.
A person whose harms all fall below the line is kept from a secure place however strong the forecast, and the people around them bear that risk.
The lapse puts a cost on the other side: when a renewal is missed, the injured person and the public lose protection, however grave the injury.
The person concerned, and those close to them
People who need several services repeat their account, because each record serves its own purpose; the cost falls hardest on those who struggle to explain themselves or need someone to speak for them.
A need written in one office's file can go unseen by the next.
Someone housed warmly on insecure terms is owed less by this item and bears the difference.
Recipients who would rather choose for themselves bear that cost.
Its cost falls on honest providers, who must find a witness; on whoever pays for witnesses; and on everyone owed an honest record, because a witness who colludes with a provider passes, where a presence check would at least demand the recipient.
Where the Act accepts reasonable belief, the bounded route asks for recorded support, independent review and an end, and carers and families bear that procedure.
A best interpretation of someone's will may choose what a best-interests decision-maker would judge worse for them, and the person bears that risk, as anyone deciding for themselves bears the risk of an unwise choice.
A people facing a large but reversible harm receives consultation and reasons where the Saramaka standard would let it refuse.
The home rule costs the person held: someone confined for years votes where they last chose to live while another place governs their days.
People whose lives change often bear the repetition, and claimants bear the wait.
Because relief waits for a properly made order, a confined person without relief or a pending filing stays confined, as Ruk does, and is owed a hearing only once a request is made.
And because an agreement leaves public accountability in place, a person who has made amends to a willing survivor can still face the public case.
Against immunity, my rule costs the discloser.
Reviewers who wrongly find a prosecution unrelated open the way to confinement, someone who controls the appointment records can manufacture that finding, and protection for a disclosure made before the charge depends on two witnesses dating it honestly; the waits the rule imposes are counted above.
The defendant bears the cost of the timing rule.
The person under a finding bears the restriction while it stays in force.
Compromised reviewers and historical witnesses can agree on false accounts, and a subject found against on such an account bears the finding until an appeal ends it.
Against abolition my rule costs the people confined and those who depend on them: time, and the job, tenancy or care that retained legal rights leave exposed in practice, the loss Norway's previously employed defendants suffered.
A denial of contact that no authorised independent witness records stays unmarked, and the person held bears that wait; routine review and the complaint route are what remain to them.
Because a disagreement between the witness and the reviewer blocks the finding, an honest dispute about the period withholds the marker from the person it concerns for as long as it lasts.
And because the placement alarm reads reports, a misplacement nobody reports raises no alarm, and the person misplaced bears it.
Claimants who would have won
My rule puts the cost on whoever funds provision, and in a real shortage on other claimants: provision will sometimes reach a duplicate or a false name, because the rules accept an encounter's name without authenticating it.
Some allocations will save fewer years than a benefit-maximising rule, and the loss falls on claimants whose longer expected lives would have won.
Their cost falls on applicants outside a measure who would have won a contested place; proof by effect costs providers, whose neutral practices must pass the tests for indirect distinctions.
People forgoing a gain or livelihood
An activity that would raise welfare on the whole remains a breach if it fails one condition, and the people who would have gained bear that.
A Guardian's pause delays the irreversible part of an authorised activity, a delay its proponent and those awaiting its benefits bear.
People whose livelihoods or diets rest on animal food bear the food rule.
A community whose practice reaches the core gains no exemption.
Providers, owners and firms
Its cost falls on honest providers, who must find a witness; on whoever pays for witnesses; and on everyone owed an honest record, because a witness who colludes with a provider passes, where a presence check would at least demand the recipient.
Their cost falls on applicants outside a measure who would have won a contested place; proof by effect costs providers, whose neutral practices must pass the tests for indirect distinctions.
Owners, farmers, researchers and households lose the power to settle an animal's interests and must justify every food, research, lethal, invasive or high-severity use against its alternatives.
Whoever funds public provision
My rule puts the cost on whoever funds provision, and in a real shortage on other claimants: provision will sometimes reach a duplicate or a false name, because the rules accept an encounter's name without authenticating it.
That costs what the conditional duty saves, and whoever funds the common tier pays for a debt owed also to people who could feed themselves.
Its cost falls on honest providers, who must find a witness; on whoever pays for witnesses; and on everyone owed an honest record, because a witness who colludes with a provider passes, where a presence check would at least demand the recipient.
The Assembly loses the power to trade the minimum against other goods, the first claim on funds presses on every other claim, and a minimum fixed in the constitution binds even where it proves ill-suited, as Mazibuko feared.
Some people able to work will choose otherwise and keep the floor, whoever funds the floor pays for them, and the design gives up whatever push into work a sanction brings.
My choice costs later taxpayers, who pay for debt an earlier majority chose, and the services above the floor, which compete with debt service.
Because a request from anyone creates a review duty, review offices owe answers to weak requests as well as strong ones, and whoever funds them pays for both.
The public owes the whole floor to people who have harmed others, the gravest offender included, at the level it owes the people they harmed, and those people must accept it.
Two people convicted of the same offence may be held in different places, and the offices must make findings a category would supply at a stroke, at public cost.
Because every complaint about custody conditions creates a duty to investigate and every confined person is owed routine review, the review body answers weak complaints as well as strong ones, and whoever funds it pays for both.
Public offices and reviewers
A restricting body must assemble evidence, three agreeing attesters, reasons and review before it acts, and the people a restriction would protect wait while it does; while a challenge suspends the restriction, they wait again.
A protective record binds a body on one source's word, before any review, and the body bears those duties unless a reviewer withdraws them.
Staggered, nonrenewable mandates mean that a new majority reaches the membership of a court or oversight body only as seats fall due, and that an experienced holder leaves when a mandate ends.
Each renewal and each measure needs its own period and review, so reviewers must keep pace with the crisis.
Because a request from anyone creates a review duty, review offices owe answers to weak requests as well as strong ones, and whoever funds them pays for both.
Two people convicted of the same offence may be held in different places, and the offices must make findings a category would supply at a stroke, at public cost.
Because isolation is marked only by a positive finding from two actors outside the holding, the holder can sign neither part of a finding about its own holding, and every finding waits for people from outside.
Because every complaint about custody conditions creates a duty to investigate and every confined person is owed routine review, the review body answers weak complaints as well as strong ones, and whoever funds it pays for both.
Majorities, voters and the public
The Assembly loses the power to trade the minimum against other goods, the first claim on funds presses on every other claim, and a minimum fixed in the constitution binds even where it proves ill-suited, as Mazibuko feared.
A later majority that judges a commons axis worth trading for prosperity cannot make the trade, however large it is.
Equal regional weight gives a resident of a small region more indirect weight than a resident of a large one when the Council decides a regional settlement.
A government that has lost the Assembly's support stays in office until a majority agrees on its successor, and the public lives under it meanwhile.
Staggered, nonrenewable mandates mean that a new majority reaches the membership of a court or oversight body only as seats fall due, and that an experienced holder leaves when a mandate ends.
The price falls on the identifiable people counted above, and on a voter seeking whom to punish, who finds a council and an Assembly majority.
Against Ackerman, a renewal renews the same four powers however large its majority; broader consent buys no broader power, and whoever a wider measure would have protected bears that.
My choice costs a later majority, however large and lasting, that wants to change what the core protects.
Reformers with majority support can be blocked by more than a third of the Assembly.
Animals
The cost falls on animals: a domesticated animal gains no say in its society, and a wild population is protected through its habitat and the commons rather than as a community of its own.
People outside the republic
A former resident who made a home abroad loses the vote in the place left behind, and people outside the republic whom its decisions affect gain no vote there.