Part I — Who counts, and what they are owed
1. The Child With Nobody
The record says that Nell was born. It names no parent, family, home, household, supporter or teacher. It records no case against Nell and no order placing Nell anywhere. Nothing says that anyone has provided anything.
Those are absences in a record. They do not tell us whether Nell has a family, where Nell lives or what Nell feels. The question is what follows from the birth entry alone.
For someone who is not a public body, a recorded birth establishes personhood. The rule asks for no parent, age, document or match against a registry. Nell therefore enters the design as a person. The other missing entries are not conditions waiting to be satisfied.
Everything owed
Every person is owed the floor: food, shelter, care, learning, safety, expression, belief and company. Each duty has the same condition — personhood. None requires employment, payment, family membership or good behaviour.
Nell is owed the whole floor. The checks ask about each debt and each entitlement, and each follows. There is no smaller entitlement pending a relative's arrival or a later registration.
Nor does anyone have to classify Nell as vulnerable. That word cannot enter the formal record; the attempted entry is refused. Protection follows without it. The record's lack of a family does not increase what is owed, and supplying a family would not reduce it.
No one is presumed to provide
A family entry would not establish that somebody fed, housed or cared for Nell. The rules expressly prevent a household, relative, association or charity from being presumed to supply another person's floor. They impose public care continuity without converting kinship into a personal-care debt.
Personhood also establishes limits on power. Children hold rights independently. No minimum speaking age may exclude their voice. Information and assistance must be accessible; support comes before removal, and separation is a last resort. An absent relationship proves neither independence nor a ground for confinement. A recorded care status is not care delivered.
These limits hold for Nell without a parent, household or chosen supporter. A few rules address a particular recorded relationship, such as a marriage or a sibling. Where that relationship is absent, its specific rule has no case to address. It does not follow that the universal protections disappear.
The next question is who must begin assistance without waiting for Nell to ask.
Help that does not wait for a request
The independent rights advocate owes every person the initiation of assistance and representation without a request. Nell is a person, so that duty follows. It needs no finding about ability, no family record and no application from Nell. It does not wait for the child to begin a proceeding.
There is also a route for somebody else to raise the concern. A passerby may record that assistance appears not to have begun. That entry gives a separate rights office a duty to review whether it was initiated. The passerby needs no seat, credential or relationship to Nell. The entry proves neither a breach nor an incapacity and gives no ground for punishment.
A distinct care-continuity case shows what a more specific public duty requires. Its record identifies the authorised actor and the care matter; no parent, caregiver, household or supporter has to hold a role. The duty does not grant the public actor parentage or authority over every aspect of the person's life. The chapter on roles follows those limits in detail.
That specific record is absent for Nell, so the particular care-continuity duty does not derive here. The duty to initiate assistance does. The requirement to begin is unconditional; a particular exercise of care authority needs its own grounds and limits.
The duty names who owes the first move. It supplies no evidence that an advocate exists, noticed Nell or acted.
What does not follow
Nell is owed food, but the record does not establish that food reached Nell. The same distinction holds for shelter, care, safety and company. Entitlement follows; delivery does not.
For these ordinary delivery conclusions, the rules need a report of receipt and matching independent evidence. The witness must be authorised for this recipient and must be distinct from the provider. Nell's record contains neither. Another test supplies those entries for a person outside custody, and the delivery conclusions follow. The difference is the evidence of receipt, not a different entitlement.
Learning also has a route through teaching that was heard. Nell's record contains no teacher and no hearing. Belief has no route certifying that a person believes; its protection does not require such a conclusion. Custody adds duties to secure shelter and voice, but supplies neither a shelter receipt nor evidence that somebody spoke. Nell is not confined in this case and needs no custody record to be owed either protection.
None of these missing conclusions says Nell is hungry, homeless, ill, unsafe or alone. The record does not establish that food arrived; it also does not establish that food failed to arrive. An account of what the rules can conclude must preserve that distinction.
The child the record never entered
Nell has one entry. Ori has none.
The rules derive no personhood for Ori, and consequently no floor entitlement or duty to begin assistance. That is a failure to reach a person through the supplied record, not a finding that Ori is not human or should be denied help. A birth or encounter entry would open the route. Until then, the rules have nothing about Ori to read.
The internal breach markers do not find Ori either. A marker that reads confinement does not apply. Even a test rule flagging every recorded person without evidence of food would reach Nell and miss Ori: it still begins with a person the record can identify. A wider entry rule cannot by itself observe someone outside every entry.
A counterfactual makes a separate dependency visible. Delete the birth rule while retaining Nell's birth entry. Personhood no longer follows for Nell, and neither do the entitlements and protections that depend on it. The retained internal markers raise no alarm about that loss. The ordinary test requiring personhood after a birth would reject this altered design, but the model does not generate that check as an alarm of its own.
These are different failures to reach the case. Ori lacks an entry; the counterfactual Nell lacks the rule that reads one. Neither is solved by assuming a family or requiring the child to ask.
Where the case leads
The birth is supplied, not observed or authenticated by the rules. From it follow both the floor and the duty to begin assistance. Provision still needs evidence of what reached Nell.
The next chapter widens the entry question. A birth is enough for Nell. What is enough for someone who arrives without a birth record?