# Who Owes, and What Follows

Who must act when a person is still waiting for what the floor owes? An
entitlement names the claim; responsibility must also reach a particular
bearer. The scarcity case from the preceding chapter follows that connection
through a shortfall, a challenge and a duty to repair.

## The chain after a finding

The waiting person in the preceding chapter has lost an allocation for one
period and keeps the claim to essential provision. The shortfall record names
that unmet claim. It gives the responsible manager duties of continuity, repair
and reassessment, and gives a separate responding office the duty to verify
that the unmet portion was recorded as failure. The manager must also publish
the allocation's comparative reasons and rejected alternatives. Those duties
have different objects: explaining the choice leaves the shortfall still to be
repaired.

When the person challenges the comparison, review becomes due without an
automatic change of allocation. A properly made finding that the comparison or
reasons are unsupported withdraws that allocation's authority. The genuine
shortage and the claimant's repair route survive. A defect in the decision
leaves every duty owed to the person still waiting.

A finding is addressed to an independently named responding office and places on
it an action duty for the specified kind of case. It is not enough that some
body somewhere is answerable: the finding, source, scope and recipient must
match the route.

A missed response needs its own evidence. Silence does not approve an act,
renew an expired power or prove a case against the claimant. A positively
certified failure to respond can transfer the unfulfilled duty to a
predeclared independent alternate. Record review, temporal review, independent
review, audit and final review retain their distinct roles and alternates. An
alternate that takes over one review holds that review alone, at its existing
scope, and the rest of the power stays where it was.

Interim continuity, an individual remedy, common-cause correction,
re-examination of affected cases and recurrence checking are separate legal
consequences. Repairing one case leaves its common cause still to be
corrected. A result that requires its own positive record follows only when
that record is present and free of conflict. Each individual finding creates
duties concerning its own subject alone.

The bearer cannot certify its own excuse. The chain starts from a recorded
finding.

## Where delivery joins it

Delivery evidence answers the receiving-side question. A matching receipt
can support a conclusion that an item reached a person. Its absence leaves
the entitlement in force. Outreach and a usable challenge are still needed.

Offer, accessibility, adequacy, receipt and remedy are distinct. Recurrence
checking covers the records it is given, within its declared period; it cannot
certify that a failure will never happen again.

## The forms public responsibility takes

The waiting claimant needs more than an explanation of the allocation.
The manager's repair duty and the responding office's review duty illustrate
why public responsibility has several forms.

To respect a right is to refrain from interfering with it. To protect is to
prevent, investigate and answer private interference through public powers.
To fulfil is to secure what the public floor requires. To continue is to
preserve protection when an ordinary bearer or provider fails. To remedy is to
restore the person after a breach.

The chapter's cases show a duty of each kind. Each has a bearer, a function, a
jurisdiction and a scope given by a current lawful source. A public body holds
the public tasks its source assigns to it, and those alone.

The floor's own duties are divided the same way, as Chapter 3 sets out: the
common tier finances and backstops the floor, a region provides and a locality
delivers, and a certified failure passes continuity to the publicly answerable
tier the certification names while the failed body's own duty stands.

## A duty cannot be contracted away

A separate delegation case asks who owes the duty when a provider takes over.
A provider undertakes a public function, and the rules assign its duty to
that provider. They also keep the public duty with the State. After the work
is contracted out, both the provider, for the work, and the State, for the
public duty, answer to the person.

A public function cannot shed its duties by being contracted out, insured,
paid through a voucher or assigned to a public, cooperative, mutual,
nonprofit, charitable, household or private provider. The performer bears
the duties of that function, and its authority over the recipient reaches only
as far as that function.

The public responsibility to finance, secure, and maintain the floor remains
throughout. Price, wealth, credit, contribution, insurance status and ability
to pay cannot decide access. Cash, a voucher or insurance approval is an
instrument. Independent evidence from the receiving side must show timely,
accessible and adequate access before that instrument can count as fulfilling
the duty.

## What voluntary provision does not do

Voluntary provision can meet a need without a duplicate public delivery.
That conclusion requires independent evidence that the protected condition
currently holds. The entitlement and public responsibility survive it.
Withdrawal, dispute, inaccessibility, inadequacy or failure requires continuity.

No household, relationship, association or charity is presumed to provide
another person's floor. A private duty must be stated for a function undertaken
or for public-scale power found independently. A record stating such a duty
for the function produces it, and the rules bar inferring one from a record of
the subject matter alone. Ordinary ownership, exchange, care, dependency and
intimacy do not create a general public power over private life.

## Duties are not a price for rights

A civic duty may have consequences when breached. Standing, the floor,
political voice, access to evidence and challenge, and a remedy that works all
survive those consequences. Lack of employment, payment, identification,
compliance or contribution gives no right to lower those protections. Any other
consequence needs its own lawful source and process.

Duties to a person, a protected common, an office or under a voluntary promise
stand level with one another until a current priority rule and independently
reviewed conflict evidence rank one above another. Missing or conflicting
priority evidence decides nothing. A protection the constitution makes
non-waivable survives any voluntary promise.

An excuse must be positively shown, current and reviewable. It can suspend or
move a bearer's performance while the claim on the other side stands.
Continuity needs a separately named alternate. Failing to answer does not
create the bearer's own excuse.

## Economic wrongs, one route at a time

The same sequence needs different actions for different wrongs. A duty to
review identifies an entry point; the remedy must reach the particular harm.

A wage denial needs a route to payment recovery. A failure of housing
continuity may need interim provision or an eviction stay. An unlawful waiver
needs review of the contract, while a defective tax or credit decision needs
its own correction. None can borrow an unrestricted remedy from the general
word *economic*.

The source separately provides for unsafe or disguised employment, unlawful
licensing, consumer harm, insolvency, expired private-power findings and
scarcity shortfalls. Remedies can include reinstatement, accommodation,
restitution, compensation, licence limits and protection against retaliation.
Structural measures such as a public option, restructuring, separation,
receivership or acquisition require their own grounds and must preserve
workers, users, ordinary savers, floor recipients and essential services.

## A way in that does not need the operator's permission

Anyone may request justice review without the original operator's permission.
A defect found independently can withdraw reliance on the affected
process or remedy and require evidence preservation, correction and relief.
A defect recorded against the wrong case or source version leaves somebody
else's remedy standing.

A positively recorded failure to respond can transfer the outstanding duty
to an independent alternate. The prior duties of access, survivor support and
protection against retaliation hold before and apart from those specific
findings. The chapter on a way to be heard follows the route from a request to
a remedy.

## When the actor is a protective power

A person, supporter, association or rights advocate can reach an independent
responding office without the acting body's permission or a complete official
record. An independently reviewed finding of unlawful force, a prohibited
practice, missing records, destruction or falsification creates the
corresponding care, evidence-preservation, correction and remedy duties.

Where the affected order is represented, withdrawal must identify that order's
source, person, case, revision, scope and period, and an unrelated remedy stays
in force. A case remedy, general constitutional invalidation and review of a
court's composition require their distinct court authorities. Care, access and
protection against retaliation are owed before any of those conclusions.

A positively recorded missed deadline sends the unanswered review duty to
an uninvolved alternate.

## When the finding is about conditions or an animal

An environmental or animal finding needs its own current basis, jurisdiction,
scope, authorised evidence, independent review and end. A defect found
independently places a duty on a named responding office even if the original
actor withholds its record. Conflicting decisive evidence withholds reliance; an
unauthorised assertion cannot veto a sound record.

Urgent protection comes before the paperwork. In the chapter's example, an
urgent animal-care request produces a duty on the State before any owner, taxon
or complete official record is recorded. The duty protects the animal without
making it a human person.

The remedies remain bounded: rescue and care, custody or rehoming, cessation
of a use, licence review, restitution of care costs, habitat repair and
structural correction require their respective authority and scope. An
advocacy claim asks for such an order and remains a request until one is made.
Inspection permission covers inspection, without a general power to enter,
search or seize. Any finding of human responsibility retains its court,
assistance, defence and appeal safeguards.

Correction does not automatically renew harmful authority, and a renamed
permit cannot reuse an ended period. Keeping a past disposition available for
comparison is different from keeping its legal force alive. Certified
nonresponse transfers an unanswered duty, without granting approval.

## The duty to begin without a request

The independent rights advocate owes every person the initiation of assistance
and representation without a request. Personhood is its whole condition, so it
holds without a capability finding, a chosen supporter or an application from
the person it protects.

Anybody may also record that nobody appears to have begun assistance for
someone. Suppose a stranger to Nell, a bystander without a seat, makes such an
entry about the child. That entry gives a separate rights office a duty to
review whether assistance was initiated. It concludes nothing about Nell's
capacity or conduct and nothing adverse against the child, whose floor stays
intact. The same entry records an encounter, so it also gives standing to the
person it names, even someone this report alone has entered, and the review
duty reaches them too.

The reviewed appointment described in the chapter on roles provides a more
specific route: a named trigger, a representative for one matter, a receipt
witness, retained voice, limited information, an end, challenge and independent
review. The duty to begin and the limits on that appointment are distinct.

## When failure is general

A claim nobody answers ends with a recorded duty nobody has discharged. That
answers one ignored claim, while a region under-providing food for a year needs
a different route. Scale is handled through a certified finding about the
failing tier; the rules count nothing and find nothing about any person.

A source and a separate independent reviewer, both distinct from the failing
tier, must certify the same publicly answerable tier as failing. The
Constitutional Court then owes a decision on whether the pattern is an
unconstitutional state of affairs, and a plan waits for that decision. The plan
duty follows only from a declaration on a certified pattern.

A declaration obliges the People's Assembly to adopt a public plan with reasons,
deadlines and an end fixed by its source. The failing tier must implement it,
and the integrity and audit body must monitor it and publish the follow-up. If
the monitor and a separate reviewer certify that the Assembly has failed to
adopt a plan, the Court owes interim measures that secure the minimum while
leaving the service to the tier, and the treasury owes the floor's minimum the
first claim on funds.

A pattern that names a private person in place of a tier certifies nothing
and leaves that person free of any duty.

## A claim that fails

Follow one person through every office that owes them something, with each
office failing in turn. Juno is met at first contact, and the entry makes Juno
a person: the floor is owed at once, the advocate owes a first move without
being asked, and the common tier owes its backstop. A witness authorised for
Juno records where Juno is present, so the region owes provision and the
locality owes reach and delivery.

A kitchen records serving Juno a meal and witnesses its own record. The
provider's word counts for its own record alone, so food stays unshown and the
debt stands. Nobody begins assistance. A passerby records that, as anybody may,
and the independent alternate now owes a review of whether assistance began.
Suppose the advocate and the alternate both stay silent. Their silence concludes
nothing adverse about Juno, whose credibility and liberty stay as they were,
and both duties remain owed.

The region fails. An auditor and an independent reviewer, both separate from
the region, certify the failure and name the common tier, which now owes
continuity while the region's own duty stands. When the failure is general, a
certified pattern in Juno's region obliges the Constitutional Court to decide.
Suppose the Court declares an unconstitutional state of affairs: that
declaration obliges the Assembly to adopt a public plan and the region to carry
it out. Once integrity and audit and a reviewer certify the Assembly's
nonresponse, the Court owes interim measures that secure the minimum, and the
provision and treasury office owes the minimum the first claim on public funds.

At every step Juno keeps standing and free movement, and at the end food is
still unshown. Each office's failure left a named duty on the next, and each of
those duties still waits on a delivery nobody has shown. How quickly any office
should have acted, and who staffs it, belong to the second book.

## What this cannot settle

A missing legal route is a constitutional gap, and calling it an operating
problem would leave it open. Each route in this chapter ends in a duty on a
named office: the advocate's initiation, the alternate's review, the Court's
decision, the Assembly's plan and the interim measures. Whether an advocate is
funded, an appointment made, a plan adopted or a remedy performed, and the
staffing, funding, capacity and facilities that make these routes available,
belong to the second book.

These public responsibilities serve a life beyond claiming and receiving.
The next part follows a person through an ordinary week, and then what people
may do without first asking an office for permission.

*Run it:* the companion runs this chapter's cases on your own device, at
[dhilipsiva.dev/rights-nobody-has-to-earn/cases](https://dhilipsiva.dev/rights-nobody-has-to-earn/cases/#chapter-6).

## Argument: Named bearers, and a court that secures the minimum

*The companion states these rules as [Article 6](https://dhilipsiva.dev/rights-nobody-has-to-earn/constitution/#article-6).*

I give every duty in this chapter a named public bearer with a function, a
place and a scope, because a right owed by everyone in general is answered by
nobody in particular, and the person waiting is the one least able to find out
who should act. The forms follow Asbjørn Eide's 1987 study for the United
Nations of duties to respect, protect and fulfil the right to food.[^eide] The
minimum follows the UN committee's General Comment 3, which holds every state
to minimum essential levels of each right, allowing for its resources.[^core]
I make that minimum a debt to each person rather than a measure of how many go
without, and add continuity for when a tier is certified as failing.

When failure is general, individual duties multiply while nobody must change
the programme. In 2004 a review chamber of Colombia's Constitutional Court
declared an unconstitutional state of affairs for internally displaced people
and ordered an action plan with deadlines and their organisations'
participation.[^t025] In 2001 India's Supreme Court, by interim order, directed
governments to implement eight food and social-security schemes.[^pucl] Both
directed governments to act, and I keep that division: the Court orders interim
measures that secure the minimum while the tier keeps the service, so
adjudication stays apart from execution and somebody remains to review the
administrator.

The strongest alternative is reasonableness review with deference to the
legislature, as South Africa's Constitutional Court practises it. In
Grootboom, the case that opens this Part, it held that the state must take
reasonable measures within its available resources and that a programme making
no provision for people in desperate need is unreasonable.[^grootboom] In
Treatment Action Campaign it found no self-standing right to a minimum core,
yet ordered restrictions on nevirapine in public hospitals and clinics removed
without delay.[^tac] In Mazibuko it refused to fix a quantity of water as the
right's content, calling that rigid and institutionally inappropriate for a
court.[^mazibuko] Mark Tushnet argues that weak-form review, which
legislatures can answer or reject, may enforce such rights better;[^tushnet]
Jeremy Waldron argues against courts striking down legislation where
democratic and judicial institutions work and people committed to rights
disagree about them.[^waldron]

David Bilchitz defends the minimum core against that approach,[^bilchitz] and I
side with him at a price. The Assembly loses the power to trade the minimum
against other goods, the first claim on funds presses on every other claim,
and a minimum fixed in the constitution binds even where it proves
ill-suited, as Mazibuko feared. Under the alternative the cost falls on the
person in urgent need whose programme is judged reasonable overall, often
someone outside the majority that sets the budget.

Charles Sabel and William Simon judged it too early to say how well American
structural remedies work once they move from judicial decrees to negotiated,
revisable plans.[^sabel] I rely on what the Colombian and Indian courts
ordered, not on what followed. I would reconsider on evidence that deferential
review reaches people in desperate need as reliably as a declared minimum, or
that declared plans and interim orders secure essentials no faster than
ordinary budgets.

[^eide]: Asbjørn Eide, *Report on the right to adequate food as a human
    right*, UN Doc. [E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23](https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23&l=en&t=pdf)
    (7 July 1987), paras 66–69.

[^core]: UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
    [General Comment No. 3](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCESCR%2FGEC%2F4758&Lang=en)
    (1990), para. 10. The obligation is the state's, judged by whether
    significant numbers of people are deprived, and the paragraph takes
    account of resource constraints.

[^t025]: Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Third Review Chamber,
    [Sentencia T-025 de 2004](https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/t-025-04.htm)
    (22 January 2004), section 7 and the first and second orders. This
    chapter relies on the judgment alone, without the Court's later follow-up
    decisions.

[^pucl]: Supreme Court of India, *People's Union for Civil Liberties v Union
    of India*, Writ Petition (Civil) 196 of 2001, interim order of 28 November
    2001, as reproduced in the Right to Food Campaign's
    [*Supreme Court Orders on the Right to Food*](https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/27433.pdf)
    (2005), pp. 43–45. The order is interim, and the petition remained pending.

[^grootboom]: *Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom*
    [2000] ZACC 19, [paras 33, 41–44 and 66–69](https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.html).

[^tac]: *Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2)* [2002] ZACC
    15, [paras 34–39, 95 and 135](https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/15.html).

[^mazibuko]: *Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg* [2009] ZACC 28,
    [paras 56–62 and 68](https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/28.html).
    The applicants sought a fixed quantity of water per person per day and
    disclaimed calling it a minimum core.

[^tushnet]: Mark Tushnet, [*Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and
    Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691143200/weak-courts-strong-rights)
    (Princeton University Press, 2008), chapter 8. The claim rests on the
    publisher's description of the book.

[^waldron]: Jeremy Waldron, ["The Core of the Case Against Judicial
    Review"](https://doi.org/10.2307/20455656), *Yale Law Journal* 115 (2006),
    1346–1406, at 1354 and 1359–1369. The argument targets strong review and
    holds under four stated assumptions.

[^bilchitz]: David Bilchitz, [*Poverty and Fundamental Rights*](https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552160.001.0001)
    (Oxford University Press, 2007), the chapters on the reasonableness
    approach and on the minimum core. *Mazibuko*, para. 57 and note 46, cites
    him as urging the approach that court declined.

[^sabel]: Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, ["Destabilization Rights: How
    Public Law Litigation Succeeds"](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/737),
    *Harvard Law Review* 117 (2004), 1016–1101, at 1016 and 1100–1101. The
    article concerns American institutional-reform litigation.

---

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